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Abstract
We study the effects of California’s tax and expenditure limitations, especially
Proposition 13. We ﬁnd that Proposition 13 was indeed effective at reducing both
ad valorem property taxes per capita and total state and local taxes per capita, at
least in the short run. We further argue that there have been unintended secondary effects that have resulted in an increased tax burden, undermining the aims
of Proposition 13. To circumvent the limits imposed by Proposition 13, the state
has drastically increased nonguaranteed debt, has privatized the public ﬁsc, and
has devolved the authority to lay and collect taxes and to spend the proceeds so
gained. The devolution of authority has been among the swiftest growing aspects
of government ﬁnance in California, to a far greater extent than in other states.
Lastly, we argue that the new tax and spending authorities that have been created to
circumvent Proposition 13 have led to a reduction in government transparency and
accountability and pose an increasing threat to our democracy.
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Californians have long been displeased with their government. The presence of
the state’s largely unchecked initiative process, however, has allowed Californians
to “[vent] their frustrations with government by drafting and passing direct initiatives” (Gerber et al 2001). Only the citizens of Oregon passed more initiatives in
the 20th century than did Californians.
Recent turns in the business cycle have accentuated Californians’ frustrations
with their government. Indeed, despite having enacted tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) in the form of Propositions 13 and 4 in 1978 and 1979, Californians
have continued to tinker with their government’s ﬁscal institutions. Voters chose to
amend Proposition 4 (also known as the Gann Initiative) twice, through Propositions 98 and 111. They have additionally rejected a slew of other proposals. Proposition 13 has been similarly amended. Presently there are more than 50 initiatives
circulating in California, with another dozen waiting for the attorney general to
approve them for circulation, and with four having qualiﬁed for the ballot. Of these
proposals, four call for constitutional conventions, six deal with taxes, one seeks
to repeal Proposition 13 and several others seek to establish a new TEL, and three
seek to change the state’s budget process, despite the passage in 2004 of a balanced
* Colin H, McCubbins is a graduate student in the Department of Political Science, Stanford University. Mathew D. McCubbins is Provost Professor of Business,
Law, and Political Economy at the Marshall School of Business, Gould School of
Law, and Department of Political Science, University of Southern California. We
would like to thank the following people for their help with data collection and
their comments: Daniel Enemark, Vladimir Kogan, Kenneth McCubbins and Ellen
Moule. A description of the methods used here, including a replication data set and
coding for STATA 11, can be requested from the authors, or can be found by searching SSRN for a working paper of the same title.
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budget initiative. Given this level of activity, and with several more proposals circulating in California, the question becomes how effective have these measures
been at actually limiting taxes and expenditures?
Despite the faith voters seem to put in them, recent research on TELs suggests
that, all else constant, they are generally ineffective in their primary goal of limiting spending and/or revenues (Kousser et al 2007, Kousser et al 2008, McCubbins
2008).1 There are two principal reasons for their failure. First, as is true of any initiative (see Gerber et al 2001, 2004), TELs need to be implemented and enforced
by the same government ofﬁcials who are the target of the limitation. This creates a
classic agency problem and we should expect agency losses to the extent that voters
cannot monitor the actions of the state government.2 Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996)
call this the “circumvention hypothesis.” State governments often carry out such
circumvention by burying spending within nongermane bills, by devolving ﬁscal
responsibility to other agents who are not subject to the limitations, by inventing
new debt mechanisms, and by privatizing public policy.
Second, although the voters use TELs to erect obstacles to taxation, those same
voters continue to demand increased government spending, inducing legislators
to bypass the voters’ obstacles. There are myriad possible explanations for the apparent contradiction in voters’ preferences: voters’ preferences may be changing;
differential turnout may change the composition of the electorate in each election;
the statewide initiative electorate may differ from the district-based constituency
of the State Assembly and Senate; the existence of TELs may affect voters’ preferences; or voters may simply hold contradictory preferences. These are examples
of a time-inconsistency problem facing voters who must consider choices offered
to them on the ballot. Thus, there will be an incentive to ﬁnd a way around a TEL.
This, in turn, causes greater citizen frustration with the legislature and further calls
for newer and better TELs.
In what follows, we show that California’s Proposition 13 was indeed effective at reducing both ad valorem property taxes and total state and local taxes,
at least temporarily. We also argue that there have been insidious and unintended
secondary effects that result in Proposition 13 being undercut. We also ﬁnd that
the state government’s efforts to bypass Proposition 13 has been one cause of the
increase in nonguaranteed debt, the privatization of the public ﬁsc, and the devolution of democracy in the state. We will argue further that the new tax and spending
authorities that have been created to circumvent the strictures of Proposition 13
have led to a reduction in government transparency and a loss of accountability. In
our discussion, we will provide a brief history that shows how California’s ﬁscal
landscape has changed in response to the passage of Propositions 13 and 4.
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The California Tax Revolt: Proposition 13 and Proposition 4
Californians passed Proposition 13 in June of 1978, limiting ad valorem property taxes to 1% of the property’s assessed value, and limiting increases in assessed
value to 2% per year. This measure, designed to prevent property taxes from pricing
residents out of their homes, was passed by nearly a two-thirds margin and remains
popular to this day. The years preceding the passage of Proposition 13 saw especially signiﬁcant gains in property tax revenue collected, with the share of state and
local revenues derived from property taxes increasing from 34% at the turn of the
decade to 44% in 1978 (Schwartz 1998). California housing prices doubled while
income remained ﬂat in the ﬁve years leading up to passage of the initiative, so
that many Californians, especially retirees, were at risk of being taxed out of their
homes, This made Proposition 13 very popular.
In 1979, Proposition 4, known as the Gann Initiative, advanced the broader
agenda set by Proposition 13. The Gann Initiative extended limitations across all
taxes in an effort to prevent the rapid growth in government seen in the 1960s
and early 1970s. The Gann Initiative pegged spending to the baseline year 1979,
and limiting budget increases each year as a function of inﬂation and population
growth. The Gann Initiative required a tax refund to be paid out to taxpayers when
revenues overran capped expenditures.
Other tax limitations, which have been proposed since, have not been nearly as
popular and most have been rejected. Indeed, Californians regularly accept increases in sales taxes, charges and fees, and assessments, which are collected as part of
a property owner’s tax bill, but are not pegged to the value of the property. Further,
Californians regularly pass bond measures and other spending requirements on the
state government. For example, recent bond measures committed the state to support stem cell research and build high-speed trains.
Research Design and Data
The most common approach to testing the effect of TELs has been to assume
that all states are the same and that all TELs are the same, and that the state ﬁnances, and the passage of TELs are independent.3 Of course, states are not all the
same. Wyoming has little in common with California and Maine is not identical to
Florida. Similarly, Proposition 2 in Massachusetts, which limited property taxes, is
different from TABOR in Colorado, which attempted to limit general ﬁscal policy.
Lastly, states’ ﬁnances are often correlated, one to the other, and the passage of a
TEL in one state often leads to the introducing of TELs in other states (see Moule
and Weller 2009), thus violating the stable unit treatment value assumption, or
SUTVA (see Rubin 1978).
3
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Existing panel studies almost always assume that a set of “control variables”
or covariates make the subjects of these studies (states) otherwise identical. Furthermore, the “treatment” in these studies is supposed to be identical, applied in an
identical manner to these identical subjects. Of course, none of the techniques used,
from differences-in-differences (Wooldridge 2002) to a random coefﬁcients model
get around the fact that we do not have random assignment of subjects to treatment and control, and thus cannot overcome the fundamental problems of causal
inference (Holland and Rubin 1988). The essence of the FPCI is that we cannot,
for example, observe ﬁscal policy in California after 1979 for both the true case,
in which Proposition 13 was passed, and the counterfactual case where it did not
(Sekhon 2004).
There are problems that cannot be overcome, however. SUTVA demands that all
subjects and treatments be identical and one cannot get around the fact that the subjects and treatments in these types of studies are not. Thus, there are large threats to
conclusion validity. For example, we know from these studies that the census sends
out a survey to the states, that different states have different ofﬁcers ﬁlling out the
survey, and that the identiﬁcation of these ofﬁcers changes from state to state and
in the same state over time. This is an instrumentation threat. Following the law of
anticipated reactions (Almond and Verba 1963, Weingast 1979), state legislatures
in one state may, after witnessing the passage of a TEL in another state, adapt
their ﬁscal policy (or at least the reporting of their ﬁscal policy) in order to avoid a
TEL of their own. This is a social-interaction threat. Furthermore, the state’s ﬁscal
behavior and the passage of a TEL may be endogenous to political and economic
conditions within the state. This is a selection-history threat. Typical methods used
to study policy effects such as differences-in-differences (Wooldridge 2002), timeseries cross-sectional methods with panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz
1995), while they have their merits, do nothing to mitigate these problems if and
when they exist.
As such, in order to better study the effects of these measures, we will explore
the “gold-standard” research design employed in Kousser et al. (2004, 2008) and
suggested in the ﬁnancial literature (for a survey see MacKinlay 1997), which is a
single state event study with a benchmark comparison (McCubbins 2008, McCubbins and Moule 2010) or a comparable interrupted time-series design. Before doing
this, it is useful to see the data.
Figure 1 displays California’s real property tax per capita. A reference line is
added to represent the passage of Proposition 13. It is apparent in Figure 1 that there
is, indeed, a large drop in the amount of per capita property taxes collected. This is
consistent with our results. Notice that, although property taxes have increased over
time, they have never caught up to their original pre-1978 level. This is an early
indication that Proposition 13 was successful in limiting taxes.
DOI: 10.2202/1944-4370.1082
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Figure 1: Real Property Tax Per Capita in California, 1971-2000
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Figure 2, which displays the total tax revenue collected in California, shows
a similar drop. However, unlike property taxes, that amount of total tax revenue
catches and exceeds its pre-1978 level within the decade.
Figure 3 shows real per capita expenditures in California. Unlike the previous
two graphs, there is no discernable drop. In fact, California’s expenditure increased
substantially approximately six years after the implementation of Proposition 13.
Figure 4 displays the ﬁrst-differences in property taxes (that is the increases or
decreases) per capita for California and a set of comparable states (labeled comparison states in Figure 4). This corroborates the evidence displayed in Figure 1 and
accentuates the drop seen in California’s property tax collections.
By this measure, Jarvis, Gann, and company were successful, and it is this data
that they can point to in support of their claim of effectiveness. One thing to note
is that real property taxes per capita have still been increasing (after, of course, the
dramatically large drop seen in 1979) at a steady rate, at some points even peaking
above most of the comparison states.

5
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Figure 2: Real Total Taxes Per Capita in California, 1971-2000
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Similarly, we can look at the effect of Proposition 13 on total state and local
tax revenues. Figure 5 displays ﬁrst differences in total state and local taxes for
California and a set of comparison states from 1971 to 2000. As was seen in Figure
4 with respect to property taxes, we can see a huge drop in total state and local tax
revenues in the year following the enactment of Proposition 13. Figure 6 displays
ﬁrst differences in total state and local expenditures. There is not the same kind of
change in this graph; indeed, it would seem that expenditures were unaffected by
Proposition 13 (as well as Proposition 4, as there is no decline in 1980 or 1981).
The line with the largest swing prior to 1980 is New York, which was suffering in
the 1970s where the drop occurs. Also in evidence are the economic recovery in
the mid-1980s and the recession and recovery in the early 1990s and late 1990s,
respectively, although interestingly not every state seemed to share in the latter
recovery.
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Figure 3: Real Expenditure Per Capita in California, 1971-2000
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To test the null hypothesis that Proposition 13 was ineffective, we ran the following regression:4

∆(FBt)= αt+β(Prop13t) +γ1∆ (PCIt)+ γ2∆ (SAPt) + γ3∆ (EP)

(1)

+γ3(HDt)+γ4(SDt)+γ 5(GDt)+ε t
Where t denotes the years 1971 to 2000 and ∆ signiﬁes the ﬁrst difference (for
all of the continuous variables) from t to t-1. FB is state ﬁscal behavior (i.e., we
use three dependent variables here, property taxes, total state and local own source
revenue, and total state and local expenditures). Prop.13 is a dummy variable representing the effective range of Proposition 13. We test two forms of the effect
of Proposition 13. We ﬁrst test the immediate effects for the year following the
implementation of the limit (thus Prop.13 is zero for all years except the ﬁrst one
following the implementation of the Prop.13 for which it takes on a value of one).
Second, we test the long-run effect, allowing the dummy to take on a value of zero
before the revenue initiative is implemented and a value of one for all years suc7

Brought to you by | Duke University
Authenticated | 152.3.129.10
Download Date | 5/15/14 8:13 PM

California Journal of Politics and Policy, Vol. 2 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 6

Figure 4: First Difference in Property Taxes Per Capita across a Panel of
States, 1971-2000
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Note: The line for California is in bold. All numbers are multiplied by 1x108 for graphical
purposes.

ceeding the event. PCI is real per capita income within the state. SAP is the fraction
of school age population (ages 5-17) and EP is the fraction of the elderly population
(ages 65+) within the total population. HD, SD, and GD are the dummy variables
for political party control of various parts of the government. HD is coded 1 if the
Democratic Party has control of the state’s lower house in year t. SD is coded 1 if
the Democratic Party has control of the state upper house. GD is coded 1 if there is
a Democratic governor (cf. Alt and Lowry 1994, 2000, 2003).
Data was collected from the Census Bureau books “Government Finances” for
the years 1971-1992 and from the Census Bureau website on Federal, State, and
Local Finances (located at: <http://www.census.gov/govs/www/estimate.html>)
for the years 1993-2000. Numbers given are divided by total population and deﬂated by the implicit price deﬂator (the implicit price deﬂator is available at <http://
research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/GDPDEF.txt>). Numbers are in millions of U.S.
DOI: 10.2202/1944-4370.1082
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Figure 5: First Difference in Total State and Local Tax Revenues Per Capita
across Panel of States, 1971-2000
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Note: The line for California is in bold. All numbers multiplied by 1x108 for graphical purposes.

dollars. Values for income and sales taxes are not differentiated from total tax revenue until 1973, so there are fewer observations for these variables. Values for the
year 1978 for these variables were unavailable so values are interpolated. In order
to help correct for nonstationarity that is typical of economic data, we employ ﬁrst
differences on all budget variables (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998).
In our ﬁrst cut at the data we estimate Equation (1) by ordinary least squares
(OLS).5 Table 1 displays the estimated coefﬁcient, associated p-values, and 95-percent conﬁdence intervals for the effect of the Proposition 13 dummy variables, as
well as the adjusted R-squared statistic for the regression. As can be seen in Table
1, Proposition 13 did lead to signiﬁcant decline in property taxes and total state and
local taxes for the year following its implementation. Since our ﬁscal and economic
variables are all ﬁrst-differences, we would only expect a change in these variables
to be signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst year after the implementation of the policy, as after
9
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Figure 6: First-Difference in Total State and Local Expenditures Per Capita
across Panel of States
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that, growth in income and population will lead to a linear growth in revenues again
and thus the post-Proposition 13 mean (of the ﬁrst differences) would be roughly
equal to the pre-Proposition 13 mean, if taken over a long enough time period in
which no other major shocks occurred. Expenditures were not cut, leading us to
believe that the effect we see here is caused by Proposition 13 and not Proposition
4, since Proposition 4 also aimed to cut government spending and, if it was successful, we should also see an effect on expenditures, which we do not. The evidence
for this can be seen in Figure 3.
The analysis in Table 1 is a single state event study, not a comparable time series. In what follows we will make use of data from comparison states that never
enacted a TEL and could not enact a TEL through the popular initiative. We exclude
states that have the popular initiative even if they have not enacted a TEL, following the logic of Gerber (1999) and Lupia and Matsusaka (2004), we believe there
could be a possible intent to treat effect, as the threat of the initiative process could
DOI: 10.2202/1944-4370.1082

10

Brought to you by | Duke University
Authenticated | 152.3.129.10
Download Date | 5/15/14 8:13 PM

McCubbins and McCubbins: Proposition 13 and The California Fiscal Shell Game

Table 1: OLS Regression of Proposition 13 on Three Fiscal Behaviors (Property Taxes, Total State and Local Expenditures, and Total State and Local
Taxes)
Proposition 13–Dummy Variable Denoting One Year Following
the Tax Limitation

Type
Property Tax
Expenditure
Total Tax

Effect (Test
Statistic and
P value)
-12.57 (0.000)
-1.47 (0.155)
-6.59 (0.000)

95% Conﬁdence Interval
(-639.1534, -458.1001)
(-828.3228, 140.2498)
(-778.406, -405.8877)

R-Squared
0.8990
0.2761
0.7909

Proposition 13–Dummy Variable for Fiscal Years 1979 to 2000
Type

Effect (Test
Statistic and
P value)

95% Conﬁdence Interval

R-Squared

Property Tax
Expenditure
Total Tax

1.57 (0.131)
1.80 (0.085)
0.71 (0.487)

(-23.69392, 170.1883)
(-24.37188, 349.6884)
(-82.6923, 168.154)

0.2570
0.3071
0.3401

sway the legislatures to limit their ﬁscal policies even without a TEL. Our comparison group, then, includes Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, Texas, Louisiana, Tennessee,
Indiana, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, West Virginia, Virginia, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, and New
Hampshire. We drop Alabama and Michigan, as they have legislatively enacted
TELs. Our selection of comparison states could be seen as analogous to Snow’s
seminal study of cholera in England. In the study, he found that there was a higher
concentration of cholera cases in locations in London served by a company that
drew their water from the Thames River downstream. Residents did not know what
part of the river their water was drawn from, due to piping, so it was as if random.
Our study is analogous to Snow’s in the sense that each state is susceptible to having a TEL passed, similar to how each person is susceptible to contracting cholera.
However, states with the initiative process are much more susceptible to contraction than noninitiative states. Thus, in order to make a control group, we focus on
the group that is least susceptible.
11
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Figure 7: Changes in California Property Taxes vs. Synthetic Control
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We use a subset of our observations on these 19 states from ﬁscal year 1971 to
ﬁscal year 2000 to construct a synthetic control for California. That is, we construct
a counterfactual or synthetic estimation of California’s ﬁscal behaviors that we hope
matches closely the Golden State’s ﬁscal behavior had it not enacted Proposition
13. We provide two robustness checks of the synthetic control data:6 ﬁrst, we measure how closely the synthetic control comports with the actual ﬁscal behaviors of
our treated case—California—prior to the treatment; and second, considering the
covariates listed in Equation (1) above, we measure covariate balance between the
synthetic control or estimated counterfactual and the factual data from California’s
real history. Our synthetic control weights each true observation among the comparison states so that they reconstruct the true observation in the pre-test treated
case (e.g., California before Proposition 13).
In Figure 7 we plot the actual changes in California’s property taxes against the
synthetic control. The algorithm used to construct the synthetic control is estimated

DOI: 10.2202/1944-4370.1082
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from the pretest observations. Notice how closely the synthetic control matches the
actual data prior to the passage of Proposition 13. The effect of Proposition 13 can
be seen by the large difference between the synthetic control and the actual changes
in property taxes in 1979. The error between the counterfactual synthetic control
and the actual value for the change in property taxes in 1979 is much larger than
any other error in the time series. The sharp decline for 1979 is, in fact, far larger
than any year-state observation for any of the time series. Indeed, we do a very
good job of estimating the ﬁscal behavior of any of the comparison states as well as
the treated state, California.
Table 2 provides some insight into the estimate of the synthetic control and how
well it approximated California’s property taxes. First, the Mean Squared Prediction Error (MSPE) of 40.447 between California and its comparison state appears
to be driven mainly by the very steep drop in the changes in the property tax variable immediately post-treatment. The other thing to notice in Table 2 are that the
covariate values for the treated (actual) and synthetic (estimated) cases are very
nearly identical for the pre-test period, giving further evidence that the synthetic
control is an appropriate case for comparison to California. Lastly, notice the unit
weights given to the comparable series for changes in property taxes. Only North
Carolina and New York have nonzero weights and of these two, nearly 92 percent
of the weight goes on the New York observations, which makes sense because California property taxes have little in common with Iowa’s or Minnesota’s.
There could be several reasons for the pattern seen in Figure 7: First, there
could have been a change in the manner of assessment. Property taxes in California are ad valorem, meaning that the amount taxed is based on the assessed value
of the property upon which the tax is levied. One of the stipulations placed on the
government by Proposition 13 was that these assessments were to occur only upon
acquisition or transaction of property and then this assessed rate was to increase by
either the inﬂation rate or two percent, whichever was lower. This turned California’s property tax base from “assessed value” to “acquisition value” (even though
property is still technically assessed upon acquisition). This, however, had several
unintended consequences.
Second, Proposition 13 could have created a “lock-in effect” among California homeowners. Scholars have argued that the acquisition value system changes
the incentives for homebuyers. Proposition 58, which allows children to inherit
their parent’s Proposition 13 assessments, and Proposition 60, which allows senior
citizens to transfer their assessments to their new houses when they move (with
certain restrictions), further changed incentives. While Stohls et al. (2001) attribute
the lock-in effect to Proposition 13, Wasi and White (2005) attribute lock-in to the
widespread adoption of rent control in California cities in the wake of Proposition
13. Another beneﬁt to the acquisition value system in place under Proposition 13
13
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Table 2: Synthetic Control Outputs – Property Taxes
RMPSE: 40.447
Predictor Balance
School Age Population
Elderly Population
Per Capita Income
Governor Dummy
House Control
Senate Control

Treated
-0.013
0.005
104582.3
1
.5
.5

Synthetic
-0.008
.004
9437.126
.959
.486
.459

Unit Weights
Covariate
Georgia
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Minnesota
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia

Unit Weight
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.918
0.082
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Figure 8: California Total State and Local Taxes vs. Synthetic Control
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has been the aforementioned revenue stability. Cal Tax Digest7 notes that this assessment system creates an environment under which property tax revenues are
inherently stable, even in the face of economic downturn. This is because these assessments do not occur annually, or even regularly. Consequently, there is no way
to capture the effect of a recession in housing prices, as they remain pegged to their
baseline. There is, almost, no way to go but up.
Figure 8 shows changes in total state and local tax revenues in California. The
ﬁgure seems similar to Figure 7, with a steep drop in 1979 followed by ups and
downs since. Although the drop in total revenues in 1979 is not quite as dramatic
as the drop in property tax revenues shown in Figure 7, there is a large effect of
Proposition 13 in 1979 when actual changes in total taxes are compared to the
counterfactual level derived from the comparison group. As shown in Table 3, the
synthetic controls were, again, largely derived by reference to ﬁscal behavior in
New York. The regressions show very strong covariate balance between California
and the synthetic control.
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Table 3: Synthetic Control Outputs – Total Taxes
RMPSE: 83.655
Predictor Balance
School Age Population
Elderly Population
Per Capita Income
Governor Dummy
House Control
Senate Control

Treated
-0.013
0.005
104582.3
1
.5
.5

Synthetic
-0.008
0.004
8829.502
.988
.496
.488

Unit Weights
Covariate
Georgia
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Minnesota
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia

Unit Weight
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
.975
.025
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Figure 9: California Total State and Local Expenditure vs. Synthetic Control
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In contrast to the marked drop in revenues shown in Figures 5 and 6, Figure 9
suggests that there was no signiﬁcant drop in state spending. Indeed, spending levels for the synthetic control almost exactly match those of California. The statistical
results can be seen in Table 4. In this case we achieve near perfect covariate balance
and our synthetic measures are based on only one state, New York.
The Fiscal Shell Game
The results in the previous section show a much greater effect for Proposition
13 than much of the previous literature has credited to it. Yet, given the dramatic
decrease in property taxes and total state and local revenue, how did spending continue to increase? There are several ways that the state and local governments have
changed the revenue landscape in order to accommodate the revenue losses caused
by Proposition 13.
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Table 4: Synthetic Controls – Total State and Local Expenditures
RMPSE: 92.107
Predictor Balance

School Age Population
Elderly Population
Per Capita Income
Governor Dummy
House Control
Senate Control

Treated
-0.013
0.005
104582.3
1
.5
.5

Synthetic
-0.008
0.004
8563
1
.5
.5

Unit Weights

Covariate
Georgia
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Minnesota
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia

Unit Weight
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Since it is apparent that Proposition 13 was successful in its design, there might
be a rush to extend the measure’s capabilities at the least and, at the most, pass a
whole new initiative to further limit the government’s ability to raise revenue. After
all, if it worked once, why wouldn’t it work again? Today’s recession together with
California’s budget crisis have made tax limitations all the more appealing. The
question remains, thus, should the public vote to pass another one of these initiatives or should further measures be adopted in a constitutional convention? Our
answer is no. First, there is substantial evidence similar to what we just presented
that most TELs do not have the intended effects (Kousser et al. 2007, Kousser et al.
2008, McCubbins and Moule 2010). Second, even when those effects are achieved,
there are other implementation problems. It is those that we will discuss here.
We mentioned previously that state voters face two problems related to implementing their enacted policies: time-inconsistency and agency loss. Despite their
ability to recognize the evils of higher taxes, polls indicate that the public still
prefers to increase government services. In polls conducted since the passage of
Proposition 13, Californians have routinely expressed a desire for an ever-increasing level of government services.
Given the time-inconsistency with respect to voters ﬁscal demands, how can
state legislators provide people with the services that they seem to want without
simultaneously increasing taxes? It was obviously still politically favorable to provide these services.
Proposition 13 undercut the ability of local governments to set property tax
rates (Shapiro and Sonstelie 1982). Grasping for revenues, municipalities turned to
other sources of income. Many governments increased sales taxes to compensate
for the lost property-tax revenue. The public outcry against sales taxes is not nearly
as great as it is for property tax levies (Schwartz 1998) and it is relatively easy for
increases in sales taxes to occur without being noticed, as sales taxes increase linearly with per capita income. By raising sales tax, the local governments were able
keep their revenue high while upholding the letter of the law that limited property
tax rates. This tax substitution allowed them to circumvent the obstacles erected by
Proposition 13 (Kousser et al. 2008). Notice in Figure 8 the ﬁrst difference in total
taxes appears to increase slightly over time, especially in the more recent years.
Municipalities also sought to increase their sales tax bases through the ﬁscalization of land-use policy. In many cities, planning became a mad dash to attract
automotive dealerships, shopping malls and strip malls by offering favorable tracts
of land along main roads. Sales-tax farming has led to the erosion of family owned
“Ma and Pa” shops that do not generate nearly the same sales-tax receipts as do
department stores and auto malls. Thus the state and local governments are cultivating, planting, and harvesting their own growth in available revenue, just as
they rode the bubble in real estate. Indeed, Schwartz (1998) notes that the sales tax
19

Brought to you by | Duke University
Authenticated | 152.3.129.10
Download Date | 5/15/14 8:13 PM

California Journal of Politics and Policy, Vol. 2 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 6

as a portion of city general funds increased from 15.54% prior to the passage of
Proposition 13 to 26.85% after.8 Redevelopment has made these land-grab policies
even easier for cities. Under the pretext that certain neighborhoods or buildings are
“blighted,” cities can trigger sweeping neighborhood reforms in which old, worn
out buildings are demolished to make way for polished, new malls.
While sales taxes and land grabs have received much attention in the literature,
a subtler substitute for property taxes has grown in popularity over the past three
decades. Charges and fees have become an integral part of the California budgetary landscape, especially in the wake of the Gann limit. Kousser, McCubbins, and
Moule (2008) note that California’s proportion of fees with respect to total general
revenue increased from 18.1% in 1969 (immediately before the passage of Proposition 13) to 31.6% by 1994. Within the group of comparison states average charges
and fees started at 22.4%, well above California’s level, and ended at 30.9%, which
is slightly below that of California (Kousser et al. 2008). Fees give the government
a revenue stream that is not subject to limitation and hard for voters to track. Cities, counties, and even school districts are able to levy fees for everything from
buildings, parks, and permits, to trafﬁc. This not only keeps the revenue from being
limited (since it is nontax revenue), it also helps to “internalize” the costs of public
services. It has been noted that these fees are much more numerous and cover a
wider variety of infrastructure in more recently developed areas (Chapman 1998).
Chapman notes that the share of service charges with respect to the total revenue
collected increased from 6% to 11% of total revenues since the passage of Proposition 13.
Another means of circumventing Proposition 13 is the creation of assessments
and assessment districts. While the practice of creating assessment districts was
not initiated in California, their use in California may be unique. Eisenhorn (1991)
wrote that, traditionally, these districts were a rejection of resource redistribution
by the local governments: establishing a “you get what you pay for” philosophy for
governmental services. California’s situation is different.
Similar to the proliferation of charges and fees in government revenue structure, California has seen a rise in the amount of special assessment districts and
the amount of money raised by them since the passage of Propositions 4 and 13.
Researchers who have studied Proposition 13’s various effects on the state budget
landscape have found that special assessments have, indeed, grown more prominent (Chapman 1998, Shires 1999, Kogan and McCubbins 2008), and these districts are often used as a means to subvert the limitations placed on the government. Special assessments often take the form of special charges on property that
pay for construction, maintenance, or other public works and services. Ironically,
property owners have to enact these assessments. Kogan and McCubbins point out
that these are “often indistinguishable from traditional property taxes in the way
DOI: 10.2202/1944-4370.1082
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they are collected and paid.” However, they further point out that they are legally
distinct because of their enactment procedures. As determined by the California
Court of Appeals in County of Fresno v. Malmstrom 1979, a “special assessment is
charged to real property to pay for beneﬁts that property has received from a local
improvement and, strictly speaking, is not a tax at all.” Thus, the Census Bureau’s
report of property taxes refers only to involuntary charges that are determined by
the assessed value of land (i.e., ad valorem property taxes). These “special taxes”
are similar, but are earmarked for a certain purpose, rather than for a variety of purposes or for the general activities of government.
The legal status of these assessment districts as a means of paying for public
improvements was hotly debated until the California Legislature passed the MelloRoos Community Facilities District Act of 1982. Despite Republican worries about
the subversion of Proposition 13 by special assessment districts, Community Facilities Districts (CFDs) actually expanded on the authorized mandates of previous
special assessments, allowing them to pay for a variety of public services (such as
police and ﬁre) that had previously been covered by property taxes. In addition,
CFDs no longer had to take into account the beneﬁts garnered by particular properties.
Kogan and McCubbins (2008) note that these assessment districts have lead to
a “hyper-fragmenting” of California’s local governments with a steeply “layered
democracy.” Kogan and McCubbins argue that this has had negative effects on the
ability of citizens to monitor their agents, simply because there are so many more
agents to look after and voters have so few tools with which to discipline their
agents.
Proposition 13 supporters were not unaware of the potential problems created
by CFDs and, as such, made a variety of attempts to expand the limitations of
Proposition 13 to include these new forms of revenue. While voters rejected such
a measure in 1984 (apparently not wanting to “save Proposition 13”), eventually,
Proposition 218, passed in 1996, deﬁned what qualiﬁed as an assessment and required a majority vote in an election before one of these assessments could be
levied. While this may have slowed the growth of various assessment districts, it
has not curtailed them completely.9 It is difﬁcult to know the extent of these special
assessments; parcel taxes are not traditional taxes. They are collected at a local
level in California, so they are not aggregated in the data presented by the Census
Bureau.
Yet another aspect of this circumvention is the underfunding of pensions. Take
the City of San Diego, for example. Riding the stock market growth of the late
1990s, the city was able to “fund” their pension system without having to make the
required payments. This freed up money for use elsewhere in the budget, which
council members there did as politicians would do anywhere, they used to aid their
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reelection. This strategy, while good for council members in their campaigns, eventually led to massive debt problems. This story, however, is not unique to San Diego; it permeates all levels of government. Indeed, the problem is not even unique
to public pensions. One, as yet unanswered question, is the extent to which the
underfunding of pensions is a consequence of Proposition 13, although it has been
quite conspicuous in California.
Conclusion
Proposition 13 appears to have had a strong initial effect: it severely limited
property tax revenues in the years following implementation of the measure. Proposition 13 also limited total state and local revenue in the year following its implementation. In this sense, the initiative achieved its purpose. However, our survey of
the literature has argued that these effects have been undercut over time, as legislators have come up with creative alternatives for government ﬁnancing, substituting
away from the traditional ad valorem property taxes towards fees, assessments, and
income and sales taxes. This circumvention of Proposition 13 is authorized by various state laws but is implemented by municipal and county governments.
One of the policy lessons to learn here is that, often, these limiting initiatives
will have a reach that extends much farther than originally anticipated. This very
problem shapes California’s ﬁnances to this day. Voters are stuck playing in a ﬁscal
shell game, where they must guess under which governmental shell the responsibility for policy lies. But governments demand high revenues because the people they
serve demand a high level of government services. If voters cut their governments
off from one source of revenue, governments will ﬁnd another source to take its
place. The net result of this, at least in California, is a towering pyramid of various
levels of government each with a distinctive source of revenue, some very small
and hard to trace, others large and visible. The multiplication and stratiﬁcation of
local governments leaves voters unable to track where their taxes go or how they
are spent, exacerbating the agency problems inherent in political delegation.
With tax and expenditure limits, as with any citizen initiative, the voters need
to consider the fact that their policy preferences may not line up exactly with the
agents they are attempting to control. Enacting initiatives and then delegating implementation to these same agents could prove to be problematic.
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Notes
1

Others, however, have argued that these limitations are indeed effective. See Elder (1992),
Shadbegian (1998), Bails and Tieslau (2000), and New (2001).
2
For more on agency problems and agency loss see Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991]) Epstein
and O’Halloran (1999).
3
Abrams and Dougan 1986; Elder 1992; Shadbegian 1996; Mullins and Joyce 1996; Shadbegian 1998; Bails and Tieslau 2000; New 2001; Mullins 2004; Mullins and Wallin 2004. These
studies have had mixed results: some ﬁnd that TELs have produced a signiﬁcantly negative effect in
government spending or revenue (Elder 1992, Bails and Tieslau 2000, New 2001), while some have
found no statistically signiﬁcant effects on either part of government ﬁscal behavior (Abrams and
Dougan 1986, Mullins and Joyce 1996).
4
Due to the near simultaneous adoption of the two propositions, we cannot sort out the effect
of Proposition 13 from Proposition 4 with the data and methods used here.
5
See Kousser et. et al. 2008 for several alternative means of estimating the impact of the
Proposition 13 “event,” on California ﬁscal behavior.
6
It is referred to as a synthetic control in that the estimation of the counterfactual data serves
as a baseline, or control, that approximates the untreated case. In this analysis, the control is a mix
of untreated states designed to approximate California without Proposition 13.
7
<http://www.caltax.org/MEMBER/digest/May98/may98-4.htm>
8
This in turn has led to the erosion of property rights, as cities have used their power of eminent
domain to remove lower-tax property owners.
9
As mentioned above, often these CFDs or other assessment districts will levy their charges
upon the public in terms of parcel taxes. As shown above, these taxes are based on acreage or a
“parcel” rather than on assessed value of property and thus are not considered property taxes under
the limitation imposed by Proposition 13. They are, however, very similar. They are, obviously, a
tax levied on property, they are collected in a similar manner, and they have turned to paying for
the same things that property taxes in California traditionally paid for, such as school bonds (among
other things). Even as such, they are not calculated into the state or local level “property tax.”.
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